The rules animals use to decide whether to fight for a resource are a major focus of study in animal behaviour, attracting great theoretical and empirical interest (Briffa & Sneddon 2010) . In a series of influential papers published in Animal Behaviour, Elwood and colleagues (Taylor & Elwood 2003; Arnott & Elwood 2009; Briffa & Elwood 2009; Elwood & Arnott 2012) have identified ways to distinguish cases in which an individual bases its decision to fight solely on its own strength or fighting ability, termed pure self-assessment, from cases in which an individual also takes into account the fighting ability of its opponent, termed mutual assessment. They also consider cumulative assessment, in which costs inflicted by the opponent influence the decision to continue fighting (Payne 1998). This important body of work urges behavioural biologists to reconsider the decision rules animals use in agonistic contests.
In a recent essay, Elwood & Arnott (2012) argue that assessment of an opponent's fighting ability is cognitively demanding and therefore probably beyond the capacity of all but the most cognitively advanced species. In reaching this conclusion they invoke Lloyd Morgan's canon, which states that psychologically simple mechanisms should be preferred in explanations of animal behaviour (Morgan 1894). While we wholeheartedly endorse this canon, we have serious misgivings about how Elwood & Arnott apply it. In the present article we address four issues with this recent interpretation of animal contests. First, we discuss mathematical models of contest behaviour and highlight a misreading of Enquist & Leimar's (1983) sequential assessment model. Second, we challenge the assumption that assessing an opponent's fighting ability requires higher cognitive faculties. In many types of contest, very simple mechanisms allow sensitivity to an opponent's fighting ability, and in fact some forms of combat may make it extremely difficult for individuals to separate the influence of their own fighting ability from their opponent's. Third, we point out an important limitation of the correlational approach commonly used to distinguish between different forms of assessment, and argue that this is valid only in situations in which the precise pattern of assortment between rivals is known. We propose that experimentally staged contests between individuals with the same fighting ability are a more powerful tool for studying contest decisions. Finally, we suggest that a categorical distinction between selfassessment and mutual assessment has outlived its usefulness. To stimulate debate, we present an alternative framework for understanding the assessment strategies used in agonistic contests, based on a two-dimensional continuum in the form of assessment. Our framework builds on an earlier suggestion that the degree of opponent assessment may be continuously variable (Prenter et al. 2006; Arnott & Elwood 2009) and extends this to consider continuous variation in self-assessment as well. The extent to which an individual's contest decisions depend on its own and its opponent's fighting abilities is likely to be constrained by the type of contest, but may also change dynamically during the course of an interaction.
Throughout this discussion we use the term 'assessment' in a broad sense. We make no assumption that this involves an explicit mental representation of fighting ability, which is something unknowable for any nonhuman species. By 'assessing' fighting ability, all we imply is that an animal's contest decisions are affected in some way by that fighting ability. In many cases this may happen through a purely physiological, noncognitive response. While this definition may seem odd to some readers, it is entirely consistent with the way that forms of assessment are inferred from contest data in nonhuman animals, relating proxies of fighting ability to contest duration (e.g. Taylor & Elwood 2003) . Our main goal in this article is to show that complex cognitive mechanisms need not be
